Meanwhile, back at the Drill Site

What's going on at the Macondo Well head is getting rather interesting.

It's now clear that the government is insisting that the original failed Blowout Preventer be removed untouched from its present condition and handed over to the government as Department of Justice "evidence" as soon as it pulled up. I like it.

BP has stopped issuing technical briefings completely and the government briefings do not have the "we're all working this together" mantra of earlier briefings. This "new" step is causing all kinds of extra time and money on BP's bill for securing the well. Obviously, some were expecting to cement with the relief well and walk away.

While things may have dropped out of the public eye, any BP plans to return to business as usual as far as Gulf drilling are not going to happen.

 

Latest update. Read the BP technical report on what the sequence of the failure was resulting in the death of the 11 workers. Here are their findings:
1) The cement designed to hold and isolate the very bottom of the well assembly in place for upcoming oil extraction was faulty. Most likely due to a bad cement formulation or contamination of the cement with drilling mud or other fluids.
2) The two check valves that prevent oil from leaking up the well pipe failed.
3) MOST ASTOUNDING - The pressure test to ensure that no oil was coming up the pipe showed an gigantic 1400 psi reading (instead of zero!). This was ignored since no leakage was seen coming out of a supposedly open pipe. (This supposedly open pipe was either blocked or improperly operated, but is at the bottom of the ocean for now.) When one of the senior well operators asked about the 1400 psi, one of the other operators stated he had seen that before, so it must be OK.
4) After the test, the valves closed for the pressure test were opened and operations were started to remove the remaining drilling mud in the well.
5) Pretty soon, the drilling mud started to come out of the well faster and faster. Nobody took any actions until the drilling mud was shooting to the top of the platforms.
6) Unfortunately, the next action was to direct the upcoming drilling mud into the wrong tank. This in turn caused the methane coming out with the mud to be directed to the internal spaces of the Deepwater Horizon. The Blowout preventer was commanded to close. It failed. Fire and sinking followed.
7) The blowout preventer (BOP) controllers failed due to a bad solenoid on one controller and dead batteries on another controller.
8) Later, manual operation of the BOP by the ROVs did not work either. Cause still being investigated.

Note that this report just focuses on the disaster "sequence" and not on the causes and conditions that lead to such a stunning string of problems and failures.